Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some other argument with the (...) result being that any discussion of what brain states are has a distinct en passant flavor. In light of this it is a goal of mine to make brain states the center of attention by providing some general discussion of them. I briefly look at the argument of Bechtel and Mundale, as I think that they expose a common misconception philosophers had about brain states early on. I then turn to briefly examining Polger's argument, as I think he offers an intuitive account of what we expect brain states to be as well as a convincing argument against a common candidate for knowledge about brain states that is currently "on the scene." I then introduce a distinction between brain states and states of the brain: Particular brain states occur against background states of the brain. I argue that brain states are patterns of synchronous neural firing, which reflects the electrical face of the brain; states of the brain are the gating and modulating of neural activity and reflect the chemical face of the brain. (shrink)

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g. first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for over-intellectualizing consciousness. We show (...) that while higher-order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are actually considerably less than often presumed. In this sense HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. Also, we clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states. (shrink)

One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (‘Higher-Order (...) Representation Of a Representation’) theory to distinguish it from relational versions of higher- order theory. In this paper I make the case that HOROR theory is a plausible account of the real nature of phenomenal consciousness whatever one’s views are about whether it is physical/reducible or not. I first clarify HOROR theory and compare it to the more traditional same-order and higher-order thought theories. Afterwards I move to presenting some considerations in favor of HOROR theory. (shrink)

[written in 2005/2006 while I was a graduate student at CUNY. This version was awarded The Southwestern Philosophical Society Presidential Prize for an outstanding paper by a graduate student or recent PhD and was subsequently published in Southwest Philosophy Review] The idea that there is something that it is like to have a thought is gaining acceptance in the philosophical community and has been argued for recently by several philosophers. Now, within this camp there is a debate about which component (...) of the, say, the belief, is qualitative? Is the qualitative component part of the content of the belief, or part of the mental attitude that we take towards the content? Some argue that the qualitative character is had by the content of the thought; others argue that it belongs to the attitude type itself. I examine the two answers and argue that the quality of thought is best understood as taking a qualitative mental attitude towards some representational content. Each propositional attitude is distinguished by a unique quality and it is having that quality with respect to the content that makes it a belief, fear (etc.) that p. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a priori arguments fail to present any real problem for physicalism. They beg the question against physicalism in the sense that the argument will only seem compelling if one is already assuming that qualitative properties are nonphysical. To show this I will present the reverse-zombie and reverse-knowledge arguments. The only evidence against physicalism is a priori arguments, but there are also a priori arguments against dualism of exactly the same variety. Each of these parity (...) arguments has premises that are just as intuitively plausible, and it cannot be the case that both the traditional scenarios and the reverse-scenarios are all ideally conceivable. Given this one set must be merely prima facie conceivable and only empirical methods will tell us which is which. So, by the time a priori methodology will be of any use it will be too late. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the dispute between Hakwan Lau, Ned Block, and David Rosenthal over the extent to which empirical results can help us decide between first-order and higher-order theories of consciousness. What emerges from this is an overall argument to the best explanation against the first-order view of consciousness and the dispelling of the mythological notion of phenomenological overflow that comes with it.

In recent times we have seen an explosion in the amount of attention paid to the conscious brain from scientists and philosophers alike. One message that has emerged loud and clear from scientific work is that the brain is a dynamical system whose operations unfold in time. Any theory of consciousness that is going to be physically realistic must take account of the intrinsic nature of neurons and brain activity. At the same time a long discussion on consciousness among philosophers (...) has resulted in our distinguishing several kinds of consciousness. So when we ask where the place of consciousness is in nature we may mean several different things. In this chapter I will argue that it is plausible that all of the kinds of consciousness turn out to be nothing but patterns of synchronized neural activity in various frequencies against a dynamically changing chemical background. (shrink)

Birch et. al. see their model as incompatible with higher-order-thought (HOT) theories of consciousness, on which a state is conscious if one is in some suitable way aware of that state. They see higher-order (HO) awareness as an “extra ingredient”. But since Birch et al go on to say that “[t]his is not the place for a detailed discussion of HOT theories,” they don’t address why they take HO awareness to be an extra ingredient or why HOT theorists are convinced (...) that it’s needed. In this commentary we argue that higher-order theories are a crucial for understanding consciousness. (shrink)

Among our conscious states are conscious thoughts. The question at the center of the recent growing literature on cognitive phenomenology is this: In consciously thinking P, is there thereby any phenomenology—is there something it’s like? One way of clarifying the question is to say that it concerns whether there is any proprietary phenomenology associated with conscious thought. Is there any phenomenology due to thinking, as opposed to phenomenology that is due to some co-occurring sensation or mental image? In this paper (...) we will present two arguments that a “yes” answer to this question of cognitive phenomenology can be obtained via appeal to the HOT theory of consciousness, especially the version articulated and defended by David Rosenthal. (shrink)

In the interesting and thought-provoking article Grazziano and colleagues argue for their Attention Schema Theory (AST) of consciousness. They present AST as a unification of Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Illusionism, and the Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory. We argue it is a mistake to equate 'subjective experience,' ad related terms, with dualism. They simply denote experience. Also, as presented, AST does not accurately capture the essence of HOT for two reasons. HOT is presented as a version of strong illusionism, which it (...) isn't, and HOT requires that one be aware of one's mental life, and postulates that his consists in a re-representation of what is occurring at at the lower-order levels. However, the authors deny that AST involves re-representing visual stimuli. We close by proposing an alternative unification: GWT and AST provide crucial accounts of how lower-order states are assembled and maintained, but higher-order theory provides the account of subjective experience. (shrink)

While it seems to be evident that the vision of the eternal return of the same is the solution to the riddle mentioned in "On the vision and the riddle," exactly what constitutes the riddle is anything but clear. Li ke all good riddles the solution demands a paradigm shift. Nietzsche's riddle is solved by a radical rethinking of the concept of time, from a straight line to a circle. I give a detailed account of how Nietzsche's riddle is formulated (...) in such a way tha t the eternal return of the same is the only possible solution. (shrink)

At this point in time the two-dimensional (2D) argument against physicalism is well known (Chalmers 2009; 2010), as are the many responses to it. However there has been a recent development that has yet to be widely discussed. Some philosophers have argued that we have equally compelling reasons to think that dualism is false based on the conceivability of mere physical duplicates which enjoy conscious experience in just the way we do (Martin 1998; Sturgeon 2000; Piccinini 2006; Frankish 2007; (...) class='Hi'>Brown 2010; Balog MS). This argument has not yet been properly understood and in this paper I aim to correct the most common misunderstandings. (shrink)

This volume is product of the third online consciousness conference, held at http:// consciousnessonline. com in February and March 2011. Chapters range over epistemological issues in the science and philosophy of perception, what neuroscience can do to help us solve philosophical issues in the philosophy of mind, what the true nature of black and white vision, pain, auditory, olfactory, or multi-modal experiences are, to higher-order theories of consciousness, synesthesia, among others. Each chapter includes a target article, commentaries, and in most (...) cases, a final response from the author. Though wide-ranging all of the papers aim to understand consciousness both from the inside, as we experience it, and from the outside as we encounter it in our science. (shrink)

Written in 2002/2003 while I was a graduate student at the University of Connecticut and ultimately submitted as part of my qualifying exam for the Master Degree in philosophy. I argue that the causal relation is observable even if the necessity of the connection is not. This version (the only one that remains) was prepared for presentation at the New Jersey Regional Philosophy Association.

Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. On this view, what differs in emotional and non-emotional states is the kind of inputs that are processed by a (...) general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide non-conscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness. (shrink)

The papers in this special issue are all descended from papers presented at the second Online Consciousness Conference. I founded the Online Consciousness Conference at Consciousness Online (http:// consciousnessonline. wordpress. com) in 2008 mostly because no one else would. Being inspired by the Online Philosophy Conference, I mentioned to several people that it would be great if we had something like that in Consciousness Studies. People I talked to were very enthusiastic but no one seemed like they wanted to initiate (...) the process. I figured I would give it a shot and have been pleasantly surprised by the results. Papers from the first conference were published in a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, papers from the second are in this special issue, and papers from the third conference (2011) are due to come out as a book in Springer’s series Studies in Brain and Mind. As I write this I am planning the fourth conference for February 2012. There is no way I could have known back in 2008 how well the conference would be received but I am grateful for that reception. (shrink)

[written in 2002/2003 while I was a graduate student at the University of Connecticut and ultimately submitted as part of my qualifying exam for the Masters of Philosophy] The question I am interested in revolves around Kant’s notion of the unity of experience. My central claim will be that, apart from the unity of experiencings and the unity of individual substances, there is a third unity: the unity of Experience. I will argue that this third unity can be conceived of (...) as a sort of ‘experiential space’ with the Aesthetic and Categories as dimensions. I call this ‘Euclidean Experience’ to emphasize the idea that individual experiencings have a ‘location’ within this framework much like individual objects have a location in space and time. The first sort of unity, that of experiences (or ‘experiencings’ as I will call them) is not enough. In order to have self-consciousness (ascribed atomic experiencings) there must be a consciousness in which the experiencings ‘take place’ just as in order for there to be objects there must be space in which they are located. With such a notion of experience in hand I argue that it can be used to bring together the solipsistic and non-solipsistic strands in Kant’s thinking. The resulting position I call ‘Polysolipsism.’. (shrink)

Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...) there are ‘typical’ combinations of semantic and justificational theories this is by no means forced on one. In the third chapter I examine two current kinds of expressivism; that of Blackburn and Copp. Each gives us an example of different combinations of semantic and justificatory theory. In Blackburn’s case he combines a use theory of meaning with a classic emotivist theory of justification, In Copp’s case it is a neo-Gricean philosophy of language with a realist’s theory of justification. I find both of these wanting as they ultimately collapse into relativistic subjectivism. In the fourth and fifth chapter I turn to developing Emotive Realism. The basic idea behind this view is that when someone says ‘x is wrong/right’ that person has (a) expressed a moral emotion about x and at the same time (b) expressed the belief that the emotion in (a) is the correct one to have. The belief expressed in (b) will be true or false depending on one’s theory of justification. In the fourth chapter I argue that we need separate semantic theories for thoughts and sentences. In the fifth chapter I fill in the details of Emotive Realism as I see it. (shrink)

We discuss cases where subjects seem to enjoy conscious experience when the relevant first-order perceptual representations are either missing or too weak to account for the experience. Though these cases are originally considered to be theoretical possibilities that may be problematical for the higher-order view of consciousness, careful considerations of actual empirical examples suggest that this strategy may backfire; these cases may cause more trouble for first-order theories instead. Specifically, these cases suggest that (I) recurrent feedback loops to V1 are (...) most likely not the neural correlate of first-order representations for conscious experience, (II) first-order views seem to have a problem accounting for the phenomenology in these cases, and either (III) a version of the ambitious higher-order approach is superior in that it is the simplest theory that can account for all results at face value, or (IV) a view where phenomenology is jointly determined by both first-order and higher-order states. In our view (III) and (IV) are both live options and the decision between them may ultimately be an empirical question that cannot yet be decided. (shrink)

David Rosenthal explains conscious mentality in terms of two independent, though complementary, theories—the higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory of consciousness and quality-space theory (“QST”) about mental qualities. It is natural to understand this combination of views as constituting a kind of representationalism about experience—that is, a version of the view that an experience’s conscious character is identical with certain of its representational properties. At times, however, Rosenthal seems to resist this characterization of his view. We explore here whether and to what (...) extent it makes sense to construe Rosenthal’s views as representationalist. Our goal is not merely terminological—discerning how best to use the expression ‘representationalism’. Rather, we argue that understanding Rosenthal’s account as a kind of representationalism permits us not only to make sense of broader debates within the philosophy of mind, but also to extend and clarify aspects of the view itself. (shrink)

As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...) encompassing, e.g., philosophy, neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Another goal was to emulate a series of conferences of the same name that had taken place in the early parts of the 20th Century. Included in the book are the title pages of these other conferences, which put the symposium in a nice historical context. The conference seems to have met both goals. It does, for instance, offer a vital snap shot of the state of emotions research at the turn of the century, though this does not mean that it is best suited for the annals of history. This volume will provide anyone interested in the cognitive science of the emotions a clear indication of where the field has come from, and insight into where it will be going. (shrink)

One of the most promising theories of consciousness currently available is higher-order thought (“HOT”) theory, according to which consciousness consists in having suitable HOTs regarding one’s mental life. But critiques of HOT theory abound. We explore here three recent objections to the theory, which we argue at bottom founder for the same reason. While many theorists today assume that consciousness is a feature of the actually existing mental states in virtue of which one has experiences, this assumption is in tension (...) with the underlying motivations for HOT theory and arguably false. We urge that these objections, though sophisticated, trade on this questionable conception of consciousness, thereby begging the question against HOT theory. We then explain how HOT theory might instead understand consciousness. (shrink)

Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to (...) introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 'stimuli-induced' or 'self-triggered' and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness. (shrink)

This highly technical book is densely packed with arguments and is an important addition to the literature. Even if one ultimately disagrees with Chalmers there is much to be gained in his exhaustive study, and he goes out of his way to show how one can accept limited or modified versions of scrutability. It is impossible for me to do justice to his argumentative rigor and comprehensive coverage of possible views in the space I have here. In the end I (...) find much of what Chalmers says convincing but something of a Pyrrhic victory. (shrink)

David Rosenthal is a well-known defender of a particular kind of theory of consciousness known as the higher-order thought theory (HOTT). Higher-order theories are united by what Rosenthal calls the Transitivity Principle (TP), which states that a mental state is conscious iff one is conscious of oneself, in some suitable way, as being in that mental state. Since there are various ways to implement TP and HOTT commits one to the view that any mental state could occur unconsciously it seems (...) to predict that a mental state’s being conscious doesn’t have any significant function to perform. An unconscious mental state, according to the theory, has most of its causal connections already, as evidenced by priming studies, subliminal perception, and other empirical findings. Given this, one early objection to HOTT was to emphasize this consequence of the theory. Since consciousness does have a function any theory which predicts that it doesn’t must be suspect. Rosenthal’s primary goal in this paper is to defend HOTT against this objection. In fact he argues that if we could establish that consciousness has no function independently of HOTT we would then have an analogous argument for it: Since consciousness doesn’t have any significant function any theory which predicts that it doesn’t fares be. (shrink)

This volume comprises original articles by leading authors – from philosophy as well as sociology – in the debate around relativism in the sociology of (scientific) knowledge. Its aim has been to bring together several threads from the relevant disciplines and to cover the discussion from historical and systematic points of view. Among the contributors are Maria Baghramian, Barry Barnes, Martin Endreß, Hubert Knoblauch, Richard Schantz and Harvey Siegel.

This study examines problems related to the representation of music. It constructs the sender/message/perceiver/result model, a prototype broad enough to incorporate a large variety of music and other notation systems, including those having to do with computers. The work defines music notation itself, describes various models for studying the subject--including the binary types prescriptive/descriptive, and symbolic/iconic--and assesses music notation as a contemporary practice. It encompasses a review of the actions and intentions of composers, performers, and audiences, and a consideration of (...) the message and how it is affected by media , reference systems , and meanings. Finally, through an examination of the possibilities of the self acting as a notation system within models posited by feminist and queer theory, I attempt to demonstrate the power of notation to affect other systems and worlds, including the worlds of music, art, and politics. ;The consideration of these topics draws on theories from linguistics, semiotics, structuralism, post-structuralism, cybernetics, and music, as well as the philosophies of John Cage, Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Nelson Goodman, and others. The work examines various languages and applications used to program computers for musical purposes, though this examination does not incorporate programs dedicated exclusively to printing music. Nor does the study focus on non-Western notations, suggestions for reforms of notation, or encyclopedic lists of notation devices. ;The expository writing is augmented by excerpts from material I gathered in numerous interviews. There are separate sections containing interviews of Leonard Meyer, Allan Kaprow, John Cage, Earle Brown, Roger Reynolds, and Heidi von Gunden. There is also a large, partially-annotated bibliography. ;My hope is that an inclusive, interdisciplinary exploration of music notation will be useful in broadening the theoretical and creative boundaries of the field, as well as bridging gaps among musicians using various music technologies, and artists and theorists from diverse fields and perspectives. (shrink)

A longish (12 page) discussion of Richard Sorabji's excellent book, with a further discussion of what it means for a theory of emotions to be a cognitive theory.

Dans 'Godel’s Way', trois éminents scientifiques discutent de questions telles que l’indécidabilité, l’incomplétude, le hasard, la calculabilité et la paraconsistence. J’aborde ces questions du point de vue de Wittgensteinian selon lesquelles il y a deux questions fondamentales qui ont des solutions complètement différentes. Il y a les questions scientifiques ou empiriques, qui sont des faits sur le monde qui doivent être étudiés de manière observationnelle et philosophique quant à la façon dont le langage peut être utilisé intelligiblement (qui incluent certaines (...) questions en mathématiques et en logique), qui doivent être décidés en regardant un comment nous utilisons réellement des mots dans des contextes particuliers. Lorsque nous obtenons clair sur le jeu de langue que nous jouons, ces sujets sont considérés comme des questions scientifiques et mathématiques ordinaires comme les autres. Les idées de Wittgenstein ont rarement été égalées et jamais dépassées et sont aussi pertinentes aujourd’hui qu’elles l’étaient il y a 80 ans lorsqu’il a dicté les Livres Bleus et Brown. Malgré ses défauts, vraiment une série de notes plutôt qu’un livre fini, c’est une source unique du travail de ces trois savants célèbres qui travaillent aux confins de la physique, des mathématiques et de la philosophie depuis plus d’un demi-siècle. Da Costa et Doria sont cités par Wolpert (voir ci-dessous ou mes articles sur Wolpert et mon examen de Yanofsky 'The Outer Limits of Reason') depuis qu’ils ont écrit sur le calcul universel, et parmi ses nombreuses réalisations, Da Costa est un pionnier dans la paraconsistence. -/- Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deux système peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 » 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Après un demi-siècle dans l’oubli, la nature de la conscience est maintenant le sujet le plus chaud dans les sciences du comportement et la philosophie. Commençant par le travail pionnier de Ludwig Wittgenstein dans les années 1930 (les Livres Bleus et Brown) et des années 50 à nos jours par son successeur logique John Searle, j’ai créé la table suivante comme un heuristique pour la poursuite de cette étude. Les lignes montrent divers aspects ou façons d’étudier et les colonnes (...) montrent les processus involontaires et les comportements volontaires comprenant les deux systèmes (deux processus) de la Structure Logique de la Conscience (LSC), qui peuvent également être considérés comme la structure logique de la rationalité (LSR-Searle), du comportement (LSB), de la personnalité (LSP), de la réalité (LSOR), de l’intentionnalité (LSI) - le terme philosophique classique, la psychologie détative , la psychologie descriptive de la pensée (DPT) - ou mieux, le langage de la psychologie descriptive de la pensée (LDPT), termes introduits ici et dans mes autres écrits très récents. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

Setelah setengah abad dalam pelupaan, sifat kesadaran sekarang topik terpanas dalam ilmu perilaku dan filsafat. Dimulai dengan karya perintis Ludwig Wittgenstein di tahun 1930-an (Blue dan Brown Books) dan dari 50-an sampai sekarang oleh penerus Logis John Searle, saya telah membuat tabel berikut sebagai heuristic untuk memajukan studi ini. Baris menunjukkan berbagai aspek atau cara belajar dan kolom menunjukkan proses yang tidak disengaja dan perilaku sukarela yang terdiri dari dua sistem (dual proses) dari struktur Logis kesadaran (LSC), yang juga (...) dapat dianggap sebagai struktur Logis rasionalitas (LSR-Searle), perilaku (LSB), kepribadian (LSP), realitas (LSOR), dari Intensionality (LSI)-istilah filosofis klasik, psikologi deskriptif kesadaran (DPC) , yang deskriptif psikologi pemikiran (DPT)-atau lebih baik, bahasa deskriptif psikologi pemikiran (LDPT), istilah yang diperkenalkan di sini dan dalam tulisan saya yang lain sangat baru-baru ini. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systEMS tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu pengetahuan, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019). (shrink)

Dopo mezzo secolo di oblio, la natura della coscienza è ora l'argomento più caldo nelle scienze comportamentali e nella filosofia. A partire dal lavoro pionieristico di Ludwig Wittgenstein negli anni '30 (i libri blu e brown) e dagli anni '50 ad oggi dal suo logico successore John Searle, ho creato la seguente tabella come euristica per promuovere questo studio. Le righe mostrano vari aspetti o modi di studio e le colonne mostrano i processi involontari e i comportamenti volontari che (...) comprendono i due sistemi (processi duali) della struttura logica della coscienza (LSC), che possono anche essere considerati come la struttura logica della razionalità (LSR-Searle), del comportamento (LSB), della personalità (LSP), della realtà (LSOR), dell'intenzionalità (LSI) -il termine filosofico, filosofico la Psicologia Descrittiva della Coscienza (DPC) , la Psicologia descrittiva del Pensiero (DPT) –o meglio, il Linguaggio della Psicologia Descrittiva del Pensiero (LDPT), termini introdotti qui e nei miei altri scritti molto recenti. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Po pół wieku w zapomnieniu, natura świadomości jest teraz najgorętszym tematem w naukach behawioralnych i filozofii. Począwszy od pionierskiej pracy Ludwiga Wittgensteina w latach 30-tych (Blue and Brown Books) i od lat 50-tych do chwili obecnej przez jego logicznego następcę Johna Searle'a, stworzyłem poniższą tabelę jako heurystykę do dalszego tego badania. Wiersze pokazują różne aspekty lub sposoby studiowania, a kolumny pokazują mimowolne procesy i dobrowolne zachowania obejmujące dwa systemy (podwójne procesy) logicznej struktury świadomości (LSC), które można również uznać za (...) logiczną strukturę racjonalności (LSR-Searle), zachowania (LSB), osobowości (LSP), rzeczywistości (LSOR), celowości (LSI) -filozoficznego klasycznego terminu, opisowa psychologia świadomości (DPC) , Psychologia Opisowa Myśli (DPT) - lub lepiej, Język Psychologii Opisowej Myśli (LDPT), terminy wprowadzone tutaj i w moich innych bardzo ostatnich pism. Ci, którzy chcą kompleksowych, aktualnych ram dla ludzkich zachowań z nowoczesnego widoku dwóch systems, mogą zapoznać sięz moją książką "Logiczna struktura filozofii, psychologii, mind ijęzyka w Ludwig wittgenstein i John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Osoby zainteresowane bardziej moimi pismami mogą zobaczyć "Talking Monkeys - Filozofia, Psychologia, Nauka, Religia i Polityka na Skazanej Planecie - Artykuły i recenzje 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) i Suicidal Utopian Urojenia w 21wieku 4th th ed (2019) i inne. (shrink)

Este libro es invaluable como sinopsis de algunos de los trabajos de uno de los más grandes filósofos de los últimos tiempos. Hay mucho valor en el análisis de sus respuestas a las confusiones básicas de la filosofía, y en los intentos generalmente excelentes de conectar el pensamiento chino clásico con la filosofía moderna. Tomo una visión moderna de Wittgensteiniano para colocarla en perspectiva. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos (...) sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2ª ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía, Historia y Literatura (2019), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky(2019) y otros. Este libro es un intento único de correlacionar la filosofía clásica china con la de Searle (S), a quien considero como el mejor desde Wittgenstein (W) y su heredero intelectual. La calidad de los artículos es inusualmente alta para una colección de este tipo, que debe deberse a la cuidadosa selección de papeles de Mou. A los lectores les resultará instructivo comparar esto con otro volumen reciente de artículos sobre la filosofía de S, "Pensando en el mundo real", otro libro en el que he escrito la única reseña. Al igual que con W, todo lo que S escribe es un tesoro, pero lamentablemente este tome ha atraído tan poca atención que esta parece ser la única revisión, a pesar de que apareció hace 6 años. Su única deficiencia real es la falta de impresión de la respuesta de S a Allinson, ya que corregiría sus numerosos errores sustanciales. Como se señaló en mis otras críticas, tales errores son de interés ya que son los impagos universales de nuestra psicología debido al hecho de que nuestro lenguaje carece de perspicuidad, como W señaló por primera vez en el BBB (Blue and Brown Books) hace 3/4 de un siglo. Cuando se grabó la conferencia, traté de obtener el video o una transcripción de la respuesta de S de Mou, S, Allinson y 3 personas en HKUST, pero nadie ayudaría. La cuestión de la espiritualidad se mezcla inevitablemente con las cuestiones del lenguaje de la filosofía en algunos de los artículos aquí. Las muchas sutilezas en el camino para disipar la ilusión del ego y la consecución de la iluminación son otra cuestión entera, aunque como en todas las demás arenas, inevitablemente surgen confusiones filosóficas cuando se habla de religión, en lugar de practicarla. Es decir, la filosofía en el sentido amplio, como la reflexiona sobre la ética, la religión, la moralidad, cómo debemos vivir o sentir nos acerca de nuestra vida y el mundo no es el sentido más estrecho en el que W y S lo están practicando, aunque inevitablemente y casi universalmente el sentido amplio se mezcla con i acerca de cómo funciona el lenguaje (la mente como W nos mostró). Como siempre, lo primero que hay que tener en cuenta es el dictum de W de que no hay nuevos descubrimientos que hacer en filosofía ni explicaciones que dar, sino sólo descripciones claras del comportamiento (lenguaje). Una vez que uno entiende que todos los problemas son confusiones sobre cómo funciona el lenguaje, estamos en paz y la filosofía en su sentido ha logrado su propósito. Como W/S ha señalado, sólo hay una realidad, por lo que en el sentido estrecho, no hay múltiples versiones de la mente o la vida o el mundo que se pueden dar significativamente, y sólo podemos comunicarnos en nuestro lenguaje público único. Mostró famosamente que no puede haber un lenguaje privado y que cualquier pensamiento "privado interno" no puede ser comunicado y no puede tener ningún papel en nuestra vida social. También debería ser muy sencillo resolver problemas filosóficos en este sentido. "Ahora bien, si no son las conexiones causales que nos preocupan, entonces las actividades de la mente están abiertas ante nosotros". Wittgenstein" El Libro Azul" p6(1933). (shrink)

Este livro é inestimável como uma sinopse de algumas das obras de um dos maiores filósofos dos últimos tempos. Há muito valor em analisar suas respostas às confusões básicas da filosofia, e em tentativas geralmente excelentes de conectar o pensamento clássico chinês com a filosofia moderna. Eu tenho uma visão moderna de Wittgensteiniano para colocá-lo em perspectiva. Aqueles que querem uma estrutura completa até o momento para o comportamento humano do ponto de vista moderno de dois sistemas podem consultar meus (...) livros Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicídio pela Democracia 4a ed (2019), Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019), Entendendo as Conexões Entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia (2019), Delírios Utópicos Suicidas no século XXI (2019), Observações sobre Impossibilidade, Incompletude, Paraconsistência, Indecidabilidade, Alealeitividade, Computabilidade, Informática, Paradoxo e Incerteza em Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, Doria, da Costa , Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock e Yanofsky (2019) e outros. Este livro é uma tentativa única de correlacionar a filosofia clássica chinesa com a de Searle (S), a quem considero ser o melhor desde Wittgenstein (W) e seu herdeiro intelectual. A qualidade dos itens é extraordinariamente alta para tal coleção, que deve ser devido à cuidadosa seleção de papéis de Mou. Os leitores acharão instrutivo comparar isso com outro volume recente de artigos sobre a filosofia de S, "Thinking About the Real World", outro livro no qual escrevi a única revisão. Como em W, tudo o que S escreve é um tesouro, mas infelizmente essa tomada tem atraído tão pouca atenção que esta parece ser a única revisão, mesmo que tenha aparecido há 6 anos. Sua única deficiência real é a falta de impressão da resposta de S a Allinson, pois corrigiria seus inúmeros erros substanciais. Como observado em minhas outras críticas, tais erros são de interesse, pois são os padrões universais de nossa psicologia devido ao fato de que nossa linguagem carece de perspicaz, como W apontou pela primeira vez no BBB (Blue and Brown Books) 3/4 de um século atrás. Quando a conferência foi gravada, tentei obter o vídeo ou uma transcrição da resposta de Mou, S, Allinson e 3 pessoas no HKUST, mas ninguém ajudou. A questão da espiritualidade inevitavelmente se mistura com as questões da linguagem da filosofia em alguns dos artigos aqui. As muitas sutilezas ao longo do caminho para dissipar a ilusão de ego e a realização da iluminação são outra questão inteira, embora como em todas as outras arenas, as confusões filosóficas inevitavelmente surgem quando falam de religião, em vez de praticá-la. Ou seja, a filosofia no sentido geral, pois reflete sobre ética, religião, moralidade, como devemos viver ou sentir sobre nossa vida e o mundo não é o sentido mais estreito em que W e S estão praticando isso , embora inevitavelmente e quase universalmente o sentido amplo é misturado com i sobre como a linguagem funciona (a mente como W nos mostrou). (shrink)

Antes de comentar en "La nueva ciencia de la mente", primero ofrezco algunos comentarios sobre filosofía y su relación con la investigación psicológica contemporánea como se ejemplifica en las obras de Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. Ayudará a ver mis reseñas de PNC (Filosofía en un Nuevo Siglo), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) y otros libros por y sobre estos genios, que proporcionan una descripción clara del comportamiento de orden superior, no se encuentra en (...) psicología ni filosofía, a la que me referiré como el marco de WS. Al igual que con tantos libros de filosofía, podríamos parar con el título. Como indican las citas y comentarios anteriores y en mis otras reseñas y los libros que cubren, hay razones convincentes para los problemas que enfrentamos al describir la psicología del orden superior considerado como conceptual y no científico. Esto debería ser cristalino para todos, pero la envidia de la ciencia y el olvido casi completo a WSH, etc. es un modo la! Pero como H señala anteriormente, los temas discutidos aquí son todo acerca de los juegos de idiomas y no tienen nada que ver con la ciencia. De hecho, como de costumbre, si uno traduce al inglés claro hay muy poco interés aquí, y ciertamente nada no dicho antes y mejor por WS, etc. innumerables veces desde los años 30 (véase, por ejemplo, The Blue and Brown Books de 1933- 35). No es de extrañar que no haga referencias significativas a ninguno de los libros o personas anteriores (¡la única referencia a S es un artículo de 1958!), aunque en mi opinión están en la parte superior de la lista de las principales figuras de la psicología descriptiva. En la p119 nos dice que la clave de todo esto es averiguar cómo "... un proceso cognitivo a nivel personal puede pertenecer a un sujeto representativo. Esta es la tarea de la segunda mitad del libro". Pero W hizo esto hace 80 años y ya que tenemos las explicaciones bellamente claras de WSH, H&M, etc., no tiene sentido torturarse con la prosa bastante sin rumbo y opaca que se desvía terminan en Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl y Frege, con un toque de ensalada de palabras posmodernista para buena medida. Un esfuerzo valiente en un tema interesante, pero en última instancia agotador e infructuoso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libros Talking Monkeys 3ª ed (2019), Estructura Logica de Filosofia, Psicología, Mente y Lenguaje en Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle 2ª ed (2019), Suicidio pela Democracia 4ª ed (2019), La Estructura Logica del Comportamiento Humano (2019), The Logical Structure de la Conciencia (2019, Comprender las Conexiones entre Ciencia, Filosofía, Psicología, Religión, Política y Economía, Historia y Literatura (2019), Delirios Utópicos Suicidas en el siglo 21 5ª ed (2019), Observaciones sobre Imposibilidad, Incompletitud, Paraconsistencia, Indecidibilidad, Aleatoriedad, Computabilidad, Paradoja e Incertidumbre en Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock y Yanofsky(2019) y otros. (shrink)

Uma vez que os problemas filosóficos são o resultado de nossa psicologia inata, ou como Wittgenstein disse, devido à falta de perspicuidade da linguagem, eles correm ao longo do discurso e comportamento humano, por isso há necessidade infinita de análise filosófica, não apenas no 'humano ciências' de filosofia, sociologia, antropologia, ciência política, psicologia, história, literatura, religião, etc., mas nas "ciências duras" da física, matemática e biologia. É universal misturar as questões do jogo de linguagem com as reais científicas sobre quais (...) são os fatos empíricos. O cientismo está sempre presente e Wittgenstein, indiscutivelmente o maior psicólogo intuitivo de todos os tempos, o colocou diante de nós há muito tempo, começando com os Blue and Brown Books no início dos anos 1930. A linguagem é programada em nossos genes e está envolvida em quase todo o nosso comportamento social. Filosofia no sentido rigoroso (ou seja, filosofia acadêmica), é como Wittgenstein nos mostrou, o estudo da forma como a linguagem é usada (jogos linguísticos) e eu a considero como a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de maior ordem (ou seja, praticamente tudo envolvendo linguagem que muitas vezes é chamado de Sistema 2 ou pensamento lento). No entanto, como espero ter mostrado em meus escritos ao longo da última década, comportamento não linguístico ou Sistema 1 ou pensamento rápido também é descrito com linguagem e isso leva a uma confusão sem fim que eu tentei esclarecer aqui e que é resumida nas tabelas que eu apresento. É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heuristica para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema 1. Eu forneço uma pesquisa crítica de algumas das principais descobertas de dois dos mais eminentes alunos de comportamento dos tempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle, sobre a estrutura lógica da intencionalidade (mente, linguagem, comportamento), tomando como meu ponto de partida A descoberta fundamental de Wittgenstein – de que todos os problemas verdadeiramente "filosóficos" são os mesmos — confusões sobre como usar a linguagem em um contexto específico, e assim todas as soluções são as mesmas — olhando como a linguagem pode ser usada no contexto em questão para que sua verdade condições (Condições de Satisfação ou COS) são claras. O problema básico é que se pode dizer qualquer coisa, mas não se pode significar (COS claro pelo Estado) qualquer expressão arbitrária e significado só é possível em um contexto muito específico. Analiso vários escritos por e sobre eles da perspectiva moderna dos dois sistemas de pensamento (popularizados como "pensando rápido, pensando devagar"), empregando uma nova tabela de intencionalidade e nova nomenclatura de sistemas duplos. Eu mostro que este é um heurístico poderoso para descrever o comportamento com críticas dos escritos de uma grande variedade de cientistas comportamentais (ou seja, todos). O primeiro grupo de artigos tenta dar alguma visão de como nos comportamos que é razoavelmente livre de ilusões teóricas, como mostrado por revisões de livros de autores líderes em filosofia e psicologia, que, como notei, podem ser vistos como a mesma disciplina em muitas situações. Na próxima seção eu comento sobre confusões muito básicas onde se poderia menos esperar - em ciências e matemática. Em seguida, recorro a confusões onde a maioria das pessoas as espera — na religião (ou seja, em grupos cooperativos formados para facilitar a reprodução). Finalmente, eu forneço alguns pontos de vista sobre áreas onde todas as questões se unem — economia e política. A chave para tudo sobre nós é a biologia, e é alheio a ela que leva milhões de pessoas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton e o Papa para defender ideais utópicos suicidas que inexoravelmente levam direto para o Inferno na Terra. Como Wittgenstein observou, é o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos que é o mais difícil de ver. Vivemos no mundo do Consciente Sistema Linguístico Deliberativo 2, mas é inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 que governa. Esta é a fonte do cegueira universal descrita por The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), de Searle, Pinker's Blank Slate e Tooby and Cosmides's Standard Social Science Model. A América e o mundo estão em processo de colapso devido ao crescimento excessivo da população. A causa principal do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata de se adaptar ao mundo moderno. Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva aos delírios da engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Daí meu ensaio "Suicídio pela Democracia". Também está claro que os sete sociopatas que governam a China estão ganhando a 3ª Guerra Mundial, e assim o meu ensaio final sobre eles. A única ameaça maior é a Inteligência Artificial que eu comento brevemente no último parágrafo. (shrink)

Dalam ' Godel ' s Way ' tiga ilmuwan terkemuka membahas isu seperti undecidability, ketidaklengkapan, kekasaran, komputasi dan paraconsistency. Saya mendekati masalah ini dari sudut pandang Wittgensteinian bahwa ada dua masalah dasar yang memiliki solusi yang sama sekali berbeda. Ada masalah ilmiah atau empiris, yang merupakan fakta tentang dunia yang perlu diselidiki masalah observationally dan filosofis mengenai bagaimana bahasa dapat digunakan secara jelas (yang mencakup pertanyaan tertentu dalam matematika dan logika), yang perlu diputuskan dengan mencarit bagaimana kita benar-benar menggunakan kata (...) dalam konteks tertentu. Ketika kita mendapatkan jelas tentang mana permainan bahasa yang kita bermain, topik ini dipandang sebagai pertanyaan ilmiah dan matematika biasa seperti orang lain. Wawasan Wittgenstein jarang sama dan tidak pernah melampaui dan seperti yang berkaitan dengan hari ini karena mereka 80 tahun yang lalu ketika dia mendikte buku Blue and Brown. Terlepas dari kegagalan-benar serangkaian catatan daripada buku selesai-ini adalah sumber yang unik dari pekerjaan tiga sarjana terkenal yang telah bekerja di tepi berdarah fisika, matematika dan filsafat selama lebih dari setengah abad. Da Costa dan Doria dikutip oleh Wolpert (Lihat di bawah atau artikel saya di Wolpert dan saya review yanofsky's ' The Outer batas dari alasan ') karena mereka menulis di Universal komputasi, dan di antara banyak prestasi, da Costa adalah pelopor dalam paraconsistency. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systEMS tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) . (shrink)

Review of "Artificial Intelligence: An MIT Perspective, Volume 1: Expert Problem Solving, Natural Language Understanding, Intelligent Computer Coaches, Representation and Learning," Patrick Henry Winston & Richard Henry Brown (eds.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1979.

According to Richard Gelwick, one of the fundamental implications of Polanyi’s epistemology is that all intellectual disciplines are inherently heuristic. This article draws out the implications of a heuristic vision of theology latent in Polanyi’s thought by placing contemporary theologian David Brown’s dynamic understanding of tradition, imagination, and revelation in the context of a Polanyian-inspired vision of reality. Consequently, such a theology will follow the example of science, reimagining its task as one of discovery rather than mere reflection (...) on a timeless body of divine revelation. The ongoing development of a theological tradition thus involves the attempt to bring one’s understanding of the question of God to bear on the whole of the human experience. The pursuit of theology as a heuristic endeavor is a bold attempt to construct an integrated vision of nothing less than the entirety of all that is, without absolutizing one’s vision, and without giving up on the question of truth. (shrink)

Review of "Artificial Intelligence: An MIT Perspective, Volume 2: Understanding Vision, Manipulation, Computer Design, Symbol Manipulation," Patrick Henry Winston & Richard Henry Brown (eds.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2nd printing, 1980.

I argue that notions of relative fundamentality need to be invoked if there is to be something substantive at stake in the debate between proponents of Harvey Brown's dynamical approach to relativity and defenders of a more traditional interpretation of spacetime. I will review some problems that stand in the way of the advocate of the dynamical approach making good on their claim that dynamical symmetries are more fundamental than spacetime symmetries.

A review essay on Jonathan Israel, The Expanding Blaze: How the American Revolution Ignited the World, 1775-1848 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017) and Richard D. Brown, Self-Evident Truths: Contesting Equal Rights from the Revolution to the Civil War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).

Corcoran’s 27 entries in the 1999 second edition of Robert Audi’s Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge UP]. -/- ancestral, axiomatic method, borderline case, categoricity, Church (Alonzo), conditional, convention T, converse (outer and inner), corresponding conditional, degenerate case, domain, De Morgan, ellipsis, laws of thought, limiting case, logical form, logical subject, material adequacy, mathematical analysis, omega, proof by recursion, recursive function theory, scheme, scope, Tarski (Alfred), tautology, universe of discourse. -/- The entire work is available online free at more than (...) one website. Paste the whole URL. http://archive.org/stream/RobertiAudi_The.Cambridge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy/Robert.Audi_The.Cambrid ge.Dictionary.of.Philosophy -/- The 2015 third edition will be available soon. Before you think of buying it read some reviews on Amazon and read reviews of its competition: For example, my review of the 2008 Oxford Companion to Philosophy, History and Philosophy of Logic,29:3,291-292. URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340701300429 -/- Some of the entries have already been found to be flawed. For example, Tarski’s expression ‘materially adequate’ was misinterpreted in at least one article and it was misused in another where ‘materially correct’ should have been used. The discussion provides an opportunity to bring more flaws to light. -/- Acknowledgements: Each of these entries was presented at meetings of The Buffalo Logic Dictionary Project sponsored by The Buffalo Logic Colloquium. The members of the colloquium read drafts before the meetings and were generous with corrections, objections, and suggestions. Usually one 90-minute meeting was devoted to one entry although in some cases, for example, “axiomatic method”, took more than one meeting. Moreover, about half of the entries are rewrites of similarly named entries in the 1995 first edition. Besides the help received from people in Buffalo, help from elsewhere was received by email. We gratefully acknowledge the following: José Miguel Sagüillo, John Zeis, Stewart Shapiro, Davis Plache, Joseph Ernst, Richard Hull, Concha Martinez, Laura Arcila, James Gasser, Barry Smith, Randall Dipert, Stanley Ziewacz, Gerald Rising, Leonard Jacuzzo, George Boger, William Demopolous, David Hitchcock, John Dawson, Daniel Halpern, William Lawvere, John Kearns, Ky Herreid, Nicolas Goodman, William Parry, Charles Lambros, Harvey Friedman, George Weaver, Hughes Leblanc, James Munz, Herbert Bohnert, Robert Tragesser, David Levin, Sriram Nambiar, and others. -/- . (shrink)

Abstract: According to a higher-order theory of consciousness, you are in a conscious (psychological) state if and only if you are conscious of being in that state. This paper develops and discusses a Euthyphro dilemma for theories of this sort; that is, a dilemma which asks whether the state is conscious because you are conscious of being in it, or, alternatively, whether you are conscious of being in it because it is conscious. I focus on two different versions of the (...) higher-order theory: the higher-order thought theory, defended by David Rosenthal, Hakwan Lau and Richard Brown, among others, and the higher-order acquaintance theory, defended by Brie Gertler, Martine Nida-Rümelin and David Chalmers, among others. I argue that both versions of the view face a Euthyphro dilemma though the issue takes a different form in each case. (shrink)

HISTÓRIA DA SOCIOLOGIA: O DESENVOLVIMENTO DA SOCIOLOGIA I -/- A SOCIOLOGIA CONTEMPORÂNEA -/- HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY I THE SOCIOLOGY CONTEMPORANY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399. -/- PREMISSA -/- Se até a década de 1960 podia-se falar em uma Sociologia dividida por países, após essa época, tendo em vista um processo significativo de circulação de informações pelos mais variados meios de comunicação, pode-se dizer que os (...) principais cientistas sociais se tornaram globalizados, assim como a literatura sociológica. As questões sociais, que até então podiam estar localizadas em países ou em blocos de países, também se tornaram mundializadas, e vários pensadores passaram a refletir sobre temas chamados de pós-modernos, hipermodernos ou simplesmente contemporâneos, e que afetam um país, uma região ou todo o mundo. A Sociologia contemporânea, porém, mantém uma relação significativa com as grandes vertentes da Sociologia anterior: • a marxista ou histórico-estrutural, com suas variações; • a durkheimiana ou funcionalista, com o desenvolvimento de um neofuncionalismo; • a weberiana ou compreensiva, com o desenvolvimento da fenomenologia e da hermenêutica; • a teórica e pragmática estadunidense, com variadas linhas. Além dessas vertentes, pensadores como Jean-Gabriel de Tarde e Georg Simmel, que estavam um tanto esquecidos, pelo menos no Brasil, em razão da ênfase em Émile Durkheim, num caso, e em Max Weber, em outro, retomaram seus lugares de destaque. Essas vertentes inspiraram outros tantos pensadores, que – refletindo sobre a realidade em que vivem, mesclando ou não contribuições de diferentes linhas teóricas e formulando uma série de conceitos – demonstram as possibilidades e a diversidade do pensamento sociológico e fazem a Sociologia avançar muito no processo de compreensão da realidade contemporânea. A combinação de diversas vertentes teóricas torna difícil fazer qualquer enquadramento ou mesmo tentar classificar determinados autores. Muitos analistas veem nisso uma crise de paradigmas na Sociologia contemporânea. Essa “crise” poderia ser entendida do ponto de vista epistemológico; entretanto, sempre houve diversidade de epistemologias na Sociologia. Acreditamos que essa diversidade epistemológica, de teorias, de objetos e de métodos, concorrentes ou não, na explicação de fenômenos sociais deve ser vista como indicativo de vigor, e não de decadência. Por fim, indico a seguir, em ordem alfabética, alguns dos pensadores e sociólogos contemporâneos cujo trabalho tem dado especial contribuição à Sociologia desenvolvida no Brasil: Alain Touraine (1925-), Anthony Giddens (1938-), Axel Honneth (1949-), Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1940-), David Harvey (1935-), Edgard Morin (1921-), François Dubet (1946), Gilles Lipovetsky (1944-), Howard S. Becker (1928-), Immanuel Wallerstein (1930-), István Mészáros (1930-2017), Jean Baudrillard (1929-2007), Jürgen Habermas (1929-), Manuel Castells (1942-), Marshall Bermann (1940-2013), Michael Löwy (1938-), Michel Maffesoli (1944-), Néstor García Canclini (1939-), Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), Norbert Elias (1897-1990), Peter Ludwig Berger (1929-2017), Ralph Dahrendorf (1929-2009), Raymond Boudon (1934-2013), Richard Sennett (1943-), Serge Moscovici (1928 -2014), Thomas Luckmann (1927-2016), Ulrich Beck (1944-2015) e Zygmunt Bauman (1925-2017). -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- CUIN, C. H.; GRESLE, F. História da Sociologia. Trad. Roberto Leal Ferreira. São Paulo: Ensaio, 1994. -/- NERY, M. C. R. Sociologia contemporânea. 1ª ed. Curitiba: IESDE, 2007. -/- NOVA, S. V. Introdução a Sociologia. 6ª ed. São Paulo: Atlas, 2004. -/- SILVA, A. et al. Sociologia em movimento. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva © 2019 -/- Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. (shrink)

A collection of articles on the the principles of social justice from an Australian Catholic perspective. Contents: Forward (Archbishop Philip Wilson), Introduction (James Franklin), The right to life (James Franklin), The right to serve and worship God in public and private (John Sharpe), The right to religious formation (Richard Rymarz), The right to personal liberty under just law (Michael Casey), The right to equal protection of just law regardless of sex, nationality, colour or creed (Sam Gregg), The right to (...) freedom of expression (Damian Grace), The right to choose and freely maintain a state of life, married or single, lay or religious (Marita Winters), The right to education (Anthony Cleary), The right to petition government for the redress of grievances (Paul Russell), The right to a nationality (Andrew Hamilton), The right to have access to the means of livelihood, by migration when necessary (Brenda Hubber), The right of association and peaceful assembly (Michael Hogan), The right to work and choose one's occupation (Ian Blandthorn), The right to personal ownership, use and disposal of property subject to the right of others (Brian Coman), The right to a living wage (Garrick Small), The right to collective bargaining (Keith Harvey), The right to associate by industries and professions to obtain economic justice (Henrik Jurisevic), The right to assistance from society, if necessary from the State, in distress of persons and family (Catherine Althaus), Afterword (James Franklin). (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited them to bring them up to date (2017). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey (...) says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable. -/- It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. Section one starts with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior. This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. -/- Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. -/- "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) -/- The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model. -/- The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to actions. -/- It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. -/- Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens) but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s future. Section one continues with other views of behavior which my reviews attempt to correct and put in context with minimal theory. -/- The next section describes the digital delusions which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System one, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it. Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”. In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Even for chemistry or physics the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty. Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear what the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor. -/- Another hi-tech delusion is that the we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/ nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2. The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences. The adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. -/- The last section describes The One Big Happy Family Delusion , i.e., that we are selected for cooperation with everyone and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia. Again the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces it. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we sell our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts greatly exacerbating the problems. -/- I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1. Our evolved psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors left Africa, to ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), but now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior, this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness. (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and the most important and longest within the last year. Also I have edited them to bring them up to date (2016). The copyright page has the date of this first edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having (...) a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., human ecology and psychology) in school, maybe civilization would have a chance. -/- In my view these articles and reviews have many novel and highly useful elements, in that they use my own version of the recently (ca. 1980’s) developed dual systems view of our brain and behavior to lay out a logical system of rationality (personality, psychology, mind, language, behavior, thought, reasoning, reality etc.) that is sorely lacking in the behavioral sciences (psychology, philosophy, literature, politics, anthropology, history, economics, sociology etc.). The philosophy centers around the two writers I have found the most important, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. -/- Now that I think I understand how the games work I have mostly lost interest in philosophy, which of course is how Wittgenstein said it should be. But since they are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put, it due to the lack of perspicuity of language, the problems run throughout all human discourse, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning principally with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. -/- "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) -/- Nevertheless, a real understanding of Wittgenstein’s work, and hence of how our psychology functions, is only beginning to spread in the second decade of the 21st century, due especially to P.M.S. Hacker (hereafter H) and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (hereafter DMS),but also to many others, some of the more prominent of whom I mention in the articles. -/- When I read ‘On Certainty’ a few years ago I characterized it in an Amazon review as the Foundation Stone of Philosophy and Psychology and the most basic document for understanding behavior, and about the same time DMS was writing articles noting that it had solved the millennia old epistemological problem of how we can know anything for certain. I realized that W was the first one to grasp what is now characterized as the two systems or dual systems of thought, and I generated a dual systems (S1 and S2) terminology which I found to be very powerful in describing behavior. I took the small table that John Searle (hereafter S) had been using, expanded it greatly, and found later that it integrated perfectly with the framework being used by various current workers in thinking and reasoning research. -/- Since they were published individually, I have tried to make the book reviews and articles stand by themselves, insofar as possible, and this accounts for the repetition of various sections, notably the table and its explanation. I start with a short article that presents the table of intentionality and briefly describes its terminology and background. Next, is by far the longest article, which attempts a survey of the work of W and S as it relates to the table and so to an understanding or description (not explanation as W insisted) of behavior. -/- The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell On Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides Standard Social Science Model. Democracy and equality are wonderful ideals, but without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation and any world that adopts them. The monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we sell our children’s heritage for temporary comforts. -/- The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the thoughts of System 1) must lead directly to actions. It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves an heuristic for how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it,includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. -/- Thus all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth. -/- My writings are available in updated versions as paperbacks and Kindles on Amazon. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) 2nd printing with corrections (Feb 2018) ASIN B0711R5LGX -/- Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) ASIN B07CQVWV9C . (shrink)